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The major purpose of this study is to determine the extent to
which education increases an individual's lifetime income and
why the increase occurs. By focusing on the monetary benefits
we do not mean to imply that the consumption benefits of edu-
cation are unimportant but only that their analysis is beyond
the scope of the present study. The most complete and elegant
model relating education to income was constructed by Becker
(1964). At the risk of doing him an injustice, we present a
simplified version of his model and indicate how it will be
implemented empirically. We then discuss some alternative
models based on different assumptions.1
Items purchased currently that produce benefits in the future
are defined as "investments" by economists. For reasons to be
spelled out shortly, education produces monetary and, perhaps,
nonmonetary benefits and qualifies as investment in human
capital. As the phrase "human capital" suggests, individuals
have certain capacities or skills of a cognitive, physical, social,
or psychological nature with which they earn a living. The level
of any one skill possessed by an individual is partly determined
by genetic inheritances and is partly acquired in the family,
from friends, from formal education, and so on. The type of ed-
ucation in which we are primarily interested increases in-
herited skill levels by developing a person's cognitive and/or
affective attainment levels. For example, higher education is
capable of teaching a person general facts, the use of specific
'Thus, we indicate how different theoretical frameworks may yield divergent es-
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tools, and general problem-solving techniques. In addition, it measuj
can influence a person's behavior by making him more tolerant sumed
of diversity, better able to stand stress, a better leader, and more The
disciplined mentally. All these aspects of cognitive and affective measul
behavior could make a person a more productive and effective two
worker.2 skills)
The skill function can be represented for the 1th person as come
year, i
Skill, =f(A,,ED,, P,, (2-1) the ext
earned
where A, represents various types of innate mental abilities; Since t
represents other innate characteristics such as personality, by an i
drive, and motivation; measures the extent of the individu-
al's formal education; and X, represents all other determinants The 1
of skill. Thus, provided people are paid for the skills they exhib- need n
it and provided education augments skills, increases in educa- nonpe
tion will lead to higher income.3 In principle it would be possi- status
ble to estimate Eq. (2-1) for all skills that determine earnings,
though we would still need to attach price tags to each skill. But poor gi
we do not know what constitutes all the relevant skills, nor do adjust
we have measures of all of them. There are, however, indirect The
ways to estimate the effect of education on earnings. One indivic
method is to combine the human-capital approach with the increas
theories of marginal productivity and perfect competition. justme:
amoun
THEMARGINAL- Accordingto the marginal-productivity theory, perfectly corn- other
petitivefirms will hire any individual, provided the real wage patent
INCOMEratepaid to him (w) is less than, or equal to, his marginal prod- de
DETERMINATION . .
UNDER PERFECTuct.By equating marginal productivity (MP) to all the skills exami
COMPETITIONdescribed by Eq. (2-1) we have
41f hours
Wj = = (2-2) increase
the disct
Since earned income is equal to the hourly wage rate times the 5These
has argu
number of hours worked per year (H), income can be used tO profiles 1
eBoththe
2Althoughwe do not try to distinguish between the affective and cognitive as- extra inc
pects of education in this study, we acknowledge that this is an extremely irn- 7There an
portant question. may rece
3For a thorough summary of research on affective development of college and Ellis
students, see Feldman and Newcomb (1969). A shorter summary is available in 8The inter
Simon and Ellison (1973) moneducation and earnings26 Thehuman-capital approach to higher education27
measure the effect of education on skills, provided H is as-
sumed constant as education varies.4
The effect of education on a person's lifetime income can be
measured by examining the income earned in every year by
two individuals who are alike in all characteristics (that produce
skills) except for education.5 However, since differences in in-
come arising from education need not be the same in every
year, it is customary to compute either the discounted value of
the extra lifetime earnings from education or the rate of return
earned over a person's lifetime on his educational investment.6
Since these calculations involve the amounts of income earned
by an individual, they are called individual, or private, rates of
return.
The benefits that accrue to the individual from his education
need not be restricted to extra earnings, but will also include
nonpecuniary benefits. These might include, for example, the
status or degree of risk in particular occupations.7 When non-
monetary rewards differ by occupation, wage rates will be a
poor guide to total benefits from education, especially if wages
adjust to offset the nonpecuniary rewards.
The total benefits accruing to all members of society from an
individual's actions are called the social benefits. Since the
increased education of only one person will not cause a read-
justment of wages, society's income increases by the same
amount as an individual's income. There may, however, be
other monetary social benefits, such as inventions that are not
patentable, or nonmonetary benefits, such as a better-function-
ing democracy, that an individual does not fully capture.8 An
examination of such benefits is beyond the scope of this book.
41f hours vary with education, then other adjustments must be made. Also,
(2-2) increases in education may reduce the likelihood of later unemployment. See
the discussion in Becker (1964).
5These characteristics should include any on-the-job investments. Mincer (1970)
has argued that such investments explain most of the variation in age-earnings
profiles by education level.
'Both these concepts incorporate the costs of obtaining education as well as the
extra income attributable to education.
7There are many other nonmonetary returns from education that an individual
may receive, and the interested reader is referred to the recent survey by Simon
and Ellison (1973) and the discussion in Hartman (1973).
'The interested reader should consult the papers of Hartman and Mundell in Sol-
mon and Taubman (1973) for a recent discussion of the subject.
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But as discussed and examined below, differences between the FIGURE2-1Income
privateand social returns may arise if education is used asa
SuP
screening device. fordoctor!
EDUCATION ASSince very few markets are perfectly competitive, the question
A ofhow various types of noncompetitive behavior affect Our
analysis and conclusions naturally arises. We consider firsta —
modelin which education is a prerequisite to entry into a par-
ticular occupation and in which entry is restricted. The medical —
professionis an example of such a model. To become a qualified
M.D., it is necessary to attend medical school (which, in turn,
requires some undergraduate training). Since the 1930s, howev-
er, the American Medical Association (AMA) has restricted
medical school enrollments and has reduced the supply of med-
ical doctors per patient.9 Suppose that in the absence of these
restrictions the supply curve of doctors would be in Figure
2-1, while the demand curve was DD with an equilibrium in-
come per doctor of Y0. Suppose that this earnings level were
such that the rate of return was equal to that available on other Alt
assets, and thus that the supply curve was stable over time. If appli
we limit college enrollment, and hence the number of doctors, prere
to S1. the supply curve becomes SASI and income per doctor contr
The income level ofoffers a rate of return on the costs in- tion
volved in attending medical school above that on other assets,
so that more people would like to enter the medical profession,
but because of control over education the supply remains SASS. the A
Notice that because doctors have a college education and a rieces
high income, a sample of people that includes doctors would in-
dicate a substantial return to a college education, even if all
other college graduates received a rate of return that only
EDUCATION ASA mc
equaled the interest rate on other assets. Imperfections such as A SCREENINGbutti
are involved in the case of doctors do not introduce complica-
DEVICE
one i
tions into calculations of the return to education; that is, since devic
doctors are assumed to earn their marginal products (even Chap
though these are very high due to artificial supply restrictions), dicat
a comparison of earnings of individuals with various levels of
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Althoughthis analysis was applied to doctors, it clearly
applies to any other occupation in which education is a
prerequisite for entrance and in which the current members can
control the number of people who obtain the required educa-
tion. Of course, there are relatively few occupations in which
education has been an absolute prerequisite for entrance over a
long period of time. In addition, very few professions have had
the AMA's power to limit the number of people obtaining the
necessary education. Thus, this type of imperfection is not
widespread.
A model that does not satisfy the assumptions of competition
but that is probably more widespread than the case of doctors is
one in which education is used as a preliminary screening
device. Because a formal discussion of screening appears in
Chapter 9, the following treatment is primarily intended to in-
dicate that different implications may be drawn from educa-
tion-income data when the standard marginal-productivity and
perfect-competition assumptions are dropped.
Individuals, who possess different levels of different types of
skills, are more productive at some jobs than at others. If there
were no nonpecuniary rewards for such factors as status or risk
attached to various occupations, then in a perfectly competitiveHigher educationand earnings3o
worldeach person would end up in the occupation in which his the ni
productivity was highest. For such a market to function, how- ave
ever, it is necessary for the employer and employee to evaluate a impoi
person's productivity and to be able to determine his approprj. exc us
ate job slot. If the labor market functioned on a piece-rate basis, Bot
an employer could let the employee take any job he wanted, and mand
then pay him by performance.'° But only relatively small sec- any ti
tions of the labor market are so organized. Instead, people are than
generally paid by the hour, week, month, or year and are hired very s
for a relatively lengthy period—subject to certain conditions— mode]
because of the substantial costs of hiring and firing, it 15P
Firms must do some sorting to match persons and jobs, but what i
subjectingpeople to prejob tests may be an expensive way to have
gain such information, especially if the tests are not particularly Suc
accurate. Even short probationary periods on the job can be ex- is exp
pensive and uninformative if a breaking-in period is needed. that s
Thus, suppose that for certain jobs, such as executive, engineer, from
and researcher, firms need people with a high level of cognitive it)'. 0
and affective skills—especially for advanced positions." If firms educa
believe that college graduates are more likely than high school feren
graduates to have the skills necessary for the advanced posi- thoug
tions, then by excluding all people with a high school education augm
only, they will not have to interview as many candidates. This proth
screening process will, however, exclude some high school educa
graduates who have the skills necessary for the position. sortin
Firms do not have to know that, on the average, college grad-
It s]
uates are better; they must merely believe this to be so. Even if level
education added nothing to a person's talents, the fact that it sense
correlates with mental ability would mean that education is an thoug
indicator of relevant skills.'2 Firms in certain occupations may strlct
therefore decide to try to recruit solely from higher educational margi
groups. However, to the extent that the number of people with not ol
a college degree desiring to work in an occupation is less than The
educa
innab
'°However, on an assembly line where one worker's productivity depends on the
number of acceptable pieces supplied to him by workers earlier in the line, an
employer cannot let anyone chosen at random work at a job even when a piece.
-Bothti
rate system is in effect. rate be
"Of course, the firms hire many people at the trainee and junior levels. For these
positions not as much skill is required, but firms may fill these positions pay a p
primarily to find talented individuals to promote. pie fro
lower
IrFor evidence that they are correlated see Chapter 5.andearnings30
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the number of positions the firms wish to fill,'3 some hiring will
have to take place from less educated groups. This represents an
important difference between the screening and the M.D.
exclusion models.
Both secular and cyclical developments on the supply and de-
mand side can affect the level of education used as a screen. If in
any time period studied the screen excluded everyone with less
than a given amount of education, then the outcome would be
very similar to, and indistinguishable from, an M.D. exclusion
model. But if some people with less education get by the screen,
it is possible to observe their wage payments and to calculate
what other people with the same education and abilities would
have earned if employed in this occupation.
Such a calculation is the heart of our test for screening, which
is explained in detail in Chapter 9. At this point we merely note
that screening implies that some people have been excluded
from occupations in which they would have a higher productiv-
ity. On the other hand, any individual obtaining the requisite
education can pass the screen; hence, observed earnings dif-
ferences do represent the private return to education even
though only a portion of the difference represents productivity
augmented by education. From a social viewpoint, only the
productivity gain is a benefit, but the social rate of return from
education could still exceed the private return if alternative
sorting systems were more expensive to operate.
It should be noted that if persons are excluded from earning a
level of income commensurate with their skills, then in some
sense the marginal-productivity theory is being violated. Al-
though a person with education below the screening level is re-
stricted to a lower-paying occupation, he isstill paid his
marginal product in this occupation, and thus the model is one
not of exploitation, but of discrimination.'4
The previous discussion has indicated that private returns to
education can be calculated by relating earnings to measures of
innate abilities, education, and other elements that produce
'3Both the supply of and demand for jobs, of course, can depend on the wage
rate being paid in the occupation.
'4"Discrimination' is probably too strong a term, because it implies that firms
pay a person less than they know he is worth. In our model, firms exclude peo-
ple from certain occupations because of the high sorting costs associated with
lower education levels.
jESTIMATIONWhilemarginal productivity has been measured directly ina
PROBLEMSfewinstances (for example, Berg, 1971), nearly all existing
implementation of the human-capital model has been based on
the indirect method of income differences. As mentioned
above, we can estimate the effect of education on earnings if we
compute a regression of the form of Eq. (2-2). Suppose for the
moment that all the assumptions made earlier in deriving this
equation are actually met in the population from which Our
sample is drawn. If all the variables in Eq. (2-2) can be measured
and the functional form specified properly, then the estimated
coefficients can be used to calculate the extra income due to ed-
ucation. However, no existing samples contain measures of all
the relevant variables. Thus, one explanation of the finding of
many researchers that income is related to education may be
that variables that should have been included in the regression
were excluded because of the unavailability of data.
Since the effect on the other coefficients of omitting a variable
has been extensively analyzed by others (see, for example,
Theil, 1961), we present only a brief summary. To simplify mat-
ters, suppose that we abstract from all but the ability and educa-
tion variables, thus giving an equation of the form
(2-3)
where u is a random error. If we use the ordinary-least-squares
estimating technique but omitit can be shown that as an es-
timate ofwe obtain b, which satisfies
E(b) =$+ yd (2-4)
where d is defined as the least-square estimate ofin
(2-5)
151t would also be possible to relate earnings to measures of skills obtained after
education was completed. To find the effects of education, we would then have
to find the net effect of education on these abilities.
The one exception occurs when wages have adjusted to offset nonpecuniary
rewards, but this problem can be solved by including a dummy variable for
those occupations for which nonpecuniary rewards are suspected to exist.
r
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skills.'5 There are, however, certain statistical problems that
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andEdenotesthe expected value of a statistic. From Eq. (2-4),
we observe that ifisomitted, then our coefficient on educa-
tion will be a biased estimate ofunless either y or diszero.'6 If
y is zero, then ability does not influence income (or skills),
while if diszero, then ability and education are not linearly
related to each other. In other words, unless either y or diszero,
our estimate of the coefficient on education attributes to educa-
tion the combined effect of ability and education.
While the above example was conducted in terms of the
two variables ED and A, it is easy to demonstrate that if ED rep-
resents all the included variables and A represents all the omit-
ted variables, the same general conclusions are reached. Thus,
in assessing the reliability of various estimates of the returns to
education, it is necessary to consider what variables have been
omitted that are related to income and education.
Of course, the set of omitted variables differs from study to
study. At this point, therefore, we will list the types of variables
that in previous research have either been suggested to be or
found to be significantly related to earnings.'7 The reader will
note that the list of variables has been divided into those that
have been included in our analysis of the NBER-TH sample and
those that have not.




3Various types of mental ability
4Physical health
(2-4) 5Age and on-the-job experience
timate ofin
(2-5)
'k,res of skills obtained after
ration, we would then have
ted to offset nonpecuniary
ing a dummy variable for
are suspected to exist.
'6Bias is a statistical concept defined as follows. We are interested in estimating a
coefficient whose true value is /3. From any sample, a particular estimating
formula will yield an estimate b of /3. We could apply the same technique to
other samples of the same size and obtain a b from each sample. We say tech-
nique is unbiased if the mean of the b's, [E(b,)}, equals
'7For there to be a bias it is also necessary for the omitted variable to be related to
education.
'In Appendix A we discuss various possible measures of attainment.
"For a more thorough analysis of measures of the quality of colleges, see Solmon




9Sex and race (by sample design)
Some other variables that may determine income but have
not been allowed for in our analysis or in the design of the
sample include




Of all the variables omitted in our analysis, we would judge
personality traits to be the most likely to bias our education co-
efficients. This bias may in fact be fairly small, since, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, the population from which the sample is
drawn is probably more homogeneous than the United States
population as a whole. Further, while people with more motiva-
tion and drive may be better able to complete college, they may
also be more impatient to drop out and begin earning income.
In any event, we do present evidence suggesting the existence
of a set of omitted variables that affect income and whose effects
persist over time.
The above discussion was based on an equation in which the
effects of education and ability were both linear and indepen-
dent of each other. In many instances it is important to deter-
mine if, or how much, the effects of education vary with educa-
tional attainment and/or ability level. In this study we allow for
nonlinear effects of education and ability and for interactions
between these two variables. It is worth noting that if, for ex-
ample, the effect of ability is nonlinear and if the relationship
between schooling and ability is also nonlinear, omitting abili-
ty from our equation will cause a differential bias at the various
education levels. Moreover, if the effects of education are
2ITha
in'
20Thesample design may have minimized differences in traits.
Ltucation and earnings34
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nonlinearbut no allowance is made for this in the estimation,
then it would be possible to conclude that the effects of educa-
tion varied with ability when, in fact, this is not the case.2' With
this background we are ready to consider some empirical
results.
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3.
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS